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Abstract— We present AVAMAT: AntiVirus and Malware 
Analysis Tool - a tool for analysing the malware detection 
capabilities of AntiVirus (AV) products running on different 
operating system (OS) platforms. Even though similar tools are 
available, such as VirusTotal and MetaDefender, they have 
several limitations, which motivated the creation of our own tool. 
With AVAMAT we are able to analyse not only whether an AV 
detects a malware, but also at what stage of inspection does it 
detect it and on what OS. AVAMAT enables experimental 
campaigns to answer various research questions, ranging from 
the detection capabilities of AVs on OSs, to optimal ways in 
which AVs could be combined to improve malware detection 
capabilities. 
Keywords— security assessment; security tool; antivirus 
software; malware analysis; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AntiVirus (AV) products are some of the most widely used 
security protection systems. They are usually deployed as the 
last line of defence on desktop, laptop, tablet and smartphone 
devices. Many studies compare their detection capabilities1. 
There are two major platforms that allow for suspicious 
files to be uploaded for scanning by multiple AV products, 
namely VirusTotal and Metadefender2.  VirusTotal is an online 
service that hosts (at the time of writing) 56 signature-based 
detection engines from different AV vendors. It is a service that 
is widely used by both academia and industry to submit and 
inspect malware samples. It also provides an Application 
Programming Interface (API) through which multiple malware 
samples can be submitted. Metadefender provides a service 
similar to VirusTotal that hosts (at the time of writing) 42 
signature-based detection engines.  
Both of these services provide a valuable resource to 
malware researchers. But they have limitations for more in-
depth analysis of AV detection capabilities: 
- Both platforms run signature-based detection engines of 
these AV products, rather than the full capability products 
that would run on an end-point. Metadefender states the 
following on its “Statistics” page (metadefender.com/stats) 
“Please note that the detection data comes from Software 
Development Kit (SDK) and Command Line Interface (CLI) 
package versions of these anti-malware engines… so 
detection results may differ significantly from commercial 
endpoint performance.” VirusTotal states the following on 
its’ “About” page: “VirusTotal's antivirus engines are 
                                                           
1 av-comparatives.org/, av-test.org/, virusbtn.com/index 
2 https://www.virustotal.com/en/, https://www.metadefender.com/  
commandline versions, so depending on the product, they 
will not behave exactly the same as the desktop versions…”. 
- Both platforms are essentially “black box” testing 
platforms. In other words, the user submits a file, and gets a 
response on whether the file was detected as malicious, 
which AV products detected it as such, and the signature 
used for the detection. But they do not provide more detail 
about when the file was detected (e.g. “on entry” - before 
being downloaded on the endhost; after it was downloaded 
but without forcing a scan; only after a scan is performed), 
or on which operating system was the AV product running 
when it detected (or not) a file as malicious. This makes it 
more difficult to assess the potential damage that a file may 
cause on the end host before a malware is actually detected, 
or whether it would have caused any damage at all on a 
given operating system.   
To overcome these limitations we built the AntiVirus and 
Malware Analysis Tool (AVAMAT) for analysing different 
malware and AV product capabilities running on different 
operating systems. Currently AVAMAT supports eight full 
capability AV products (i.e. the full versions of AV products, 
rather than just signature based detection engines), namely: 
AVG, Comodo, F-Secure, Kaspersky, FProt, Trend, Avira and 
Emsisoft. These AV products are run, where available, on three 
versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems: XP, 7 
and 8.  With AVAMAT, a researcher can: 
- analyse the diversity of detection capabilities between 
different AntiVirus software on different operating systems. 
Being able to analyse the same malware on machines with 
the same AV yet different operating system allows us to 
investigate the operating system’s effect on AV and 
malware behaviour. And analysing the detection 
capabilities of different AV products allows us to compare 
the benefits of combining multiple diverse AVs in a diverse 
defence-in-depth setup.   
- analyse when does an AV product detect a malware it 
encounters. We classify the detection in four stages 
depending on when a malware is detected: on entry; after a 
short wait; on a full scan, or after malware execution. This 
allows us to, for example, better classify whether the 
malware will be detected and prevented from running on 
the end-host machine, or whether the malware would run 
first before being executed, hence potentially requiring a 
clean-up and full scan of the machine. Again we will 
analyse the diversity that exists in these classifications 
between different AV products and different OSs.  
978-1-5386-1465-5/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE 
2 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines 
AVAMAT; Section III contains examples of initial results 
obtained with AVAMAT; Section IV contains related work on 
AV testing platforms; Section V outlines the main conclusions. 
II. AVAMAT ARCHITECTURE 
The AVAMAT architecture is built on top of open-source 
software and uses custom-developed scripts to allow us to test 
whether an AV a, running on a given OS o, detects a given 
malware m on a given date d, and, if it detects it, when does it 
do so. We will use the shorthand VM(a,o) to refer to a given 
virtual machine that runs an AV a on an OS o. There are four 
main components of AVAMAT: 
- AV interfacing script (Skeleton): interfaces with custom-
developed scripts on each VM(a,o). The skeleton chooses 
the specific script on VM(a,o). Once selected, the skeleton 
uses the functions in the custom-developed script to 
perform an analysis on malware m;  
- Updaters: at the start of each experimental campaign, 
updates the OS and AV with the latest updates and patches 
available for each VM(a,o);  
- Snapshot Manager: at the start of each experimental 
campaign, takes a snapshot of each virtual machine 
VM(a,o); after the virtual machine is finished inspecting a 
given malware m it reverts back to the last snapshot 
(ensuring that all malware in a given experimental 
campaign are executed by the same VM(a,o));    
- Experiment Scheduler: the administrator of the 
experiment can specify how many times should an 
experimental campaign be repeated. This may be useful to 
enable, for example, testing how long it takes for an AV 
product to detect a malware it has not detected in the past.   
Figure 1 shows the AV products and OSs currently 
supported in AVAMAT.   
  
FIG. 1 – THE AV PRODUCTS AND OSS CURRENTLY SUPPORTED IN AVAMAT. 
EACH BOX IS ONE VIRTUAL MACHINE (WE REFER TO A BOX AS VM(A,O)). 
AVIRA AND EMISOFT NO LONGER SUPPORT WINDOWS XP VERSIONS, HENCE 
THEY ARE MISSING FROM THE FIGURE ABOVE. 
A. AV Interfacing script (Skeleton) 
At the core of AVAMAT’s infrastructure is the Cuckoo 
sandbox (cuckoosandbox.org). Cuckoo sandbox is an open 
source automated malware analysis system. AVAMAT uses a 
customized analysis package that puts the malware on a 
machine, and then runs the AV Interfacing script (Skeleton). 
The Skeleton is a Python script we have developed which 
coordinates the scanning and logging of all the malware m by 
an AV product a. A copy of the Skeleton resides on each of the 
guest virtual machines that runs an AV product a on an OS o. 
The guest virtual machines are created with KVM (linux-
kvm.org). When the Skeleton finishes, the analysis package 
uploads the results file that the Skeleton generates back on to 
the host machine. The results include information about: the 
malware m that was just scanned, the OS o (name, version), the 
AV product a (name, version), the time and date d on which 
this test happened and the point at which the AV product a 
detected the malware m, if it did at all. An agent script running 
on the machine at start-up uploads malware to each machine. 
There are four stages at which the skeleton checks if the 
malware is found (Figure 2 illustrates this): 
- on entry (the malware m is detected by VM(a,o) on 
attempted download: the AV a detects the payload as 
malicious and stops it before it downloads);   
- after a short wait (currently set to 10 seconds) (i.e. the 
malware was not detected on entry to VM(a,o), but was 
detected by the AV product a less than 10 seconds after it 
was downloaded on OS o); 
- on a scan (the malware was downloaded on VM(a,o), 10 
seconds have passed, and a scan was initiated, and only 
then was the malware detected by the AV product a); 
- after execution (the malware was not detected in any of the 
aforementioned stages, but was detected when the file is 
executed);  
- no detection – if no detection in any of the above four 
stages. 
Since the stages are sequential (e.g., we only do a scan if 
the malware was not detected in the previous stage(s)), the 
results give us information not only about whether an AV 
product detected a malware, but also when did it detect it. So, 
for example, 1110 means the malware was not detected in 
VM(a,o) in three earlier stages (“on entry”, “after 10 seconds” 
and “on scan”), and only detected when the malware was 
executed. 
-  
FIG. 2. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OBTAINED ON A VM(A,O). 0 MEANS DETECTION 
(NO FAILURE); 1 MEANS NO DETECTION (FAILURE).  
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AVAMAT uses Cuckoo to: communicate between the host 
machine where the results are stored, and the guest machines 
where the AV products are running; submit malware samples 
from the repository of malware stored in the host machine to 
the guest machines; execute Cuckoo’s analysis package and 
upload the results to the host machine.  
The host machine runs the virtualization software (KVM), 
from which the guest virtual machines VM (a,o) are run, stores 
the repository of malware, and an SQL database which stores 
the results of testing. The host machine is setup to have an 
instance of Cuckoo for every VM(a,o). Along with each 
instance of Cuckoo it also contains its own unique process, 
tasks database, and results server port. Each instance of Cuckoo 
has its own task database, hence allowing it to synchronize 
running different VM(a,o) instances at the same time.   
Each guest machine VM(a,o) has three main components 
written in Python: an adapter interfacing script (Skeleton), an 
AV Adapter script and an Agent. Figure 3 depicts the high 
level architecture  of the Skeleton, AV Adapters and Agents for 
one VM(a,o), and how it communicates with the host machine.  
 
FIG. 3 - COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE HOST MACHINE WHERE THE RESULTS 
ARE STORED AND ONE GUEST MACHINE VM(A,O) THERE IS ONE CUCKOO PORT 
USED BY EACH VM(A,O). 
The Agent is an element of Cuckoo that enables 
communication between the host operating system and the 
guest operating systems.  It establishes a TCP connection with 
the host, allowing the host to send malware and the guest to 
upload the analysis results. The Skeleton mediates between the 
Agent and the AV Adapter functions, which gather the data on 
the guest machine.  To determine the detection stage, the 
Skeleton calls on the AV Adapter’s functions. The Skeleton 
records in a results text file the stage at which the malware has 
been found (if at all) and the signature with which a given AV 
product has detected the malware (if a signature is returned by 
the AV product). We have a customized AV Adapter for each 
VM(a,o) that accounts for operating system and for the 
respective AV products. The AV Adapter implements 
functions the skeleton expects when performing analysis.  
The multiple functions in the AV adapter get the program 
version, database version, engine version, malware signature, 
as well as running an antivirus scan (if applicable to the 
analysis). 
B. Updaters, Snapshot Manager and Experiment Scheduler 
Updaters: Before we start an experiment with AVAMAT 
we ensure that all VM(a,o) have the latest updates applied.  
AVAMAT runs automated scripts that update each VM(a,o) 
with the latest updates available for each AV a and OS o.   
Snapshot Manager: AVAMAT allows for multiple 
malware to be sent to a given VM(a,o) in succession. So, after 
we have retrieved the results from a given VM(a,o) when it 
analysed malware mi, AVAMAT restores the state of the 
VM(a,o) to the state it was before sending it malware mi. This 
ensure that when we send the next malware mi+1 to it the state 
of VM(a,o) has not been contaminated by malware mi. For this 
we use built-in machine management functionality of the 
cuckoo sandbox. Cuckoo has built-in libraries to revert to 
snapshots of different virtualization software.  
Experiment Scheduler: AVAMAT allows a researcher to 
configure and run an entire experimental campaign over a long 
period of time with limited supervision. For each repetition of 
the experiment:  
- We run the Updaters once for each VM(a,o);  
- We run the Snapshot manager once at the start of the 
experiment (i.e. before sending any malware to it). We 
then revert back to this clean snapshot of a given VM(a,o) 
after each malware m is inspected by that VM(a,o);  
We run the Skeleton once after each malware m sent to a 
VM(a,o). 
III. RESULTS FROM USING AVAMAT 
AVAMAT is currently in testing mode. In what follows we 
show examples of analysis using results obtained from testing 
with AVAMAT that are not possible to obtain with VirusTotal 
or Metadefender. The malware we used during testing have 
been collected from research honeypots that we have been 
running for several years.  
Table 1 shows the behaviour of Kaspersky AV when 
inspecting two malware in AVAMAT. For the first malware in 
the table Kaspersky detected it on Windows 7 and 8 (on scan, 
i.e. step 110), but not on XP (i.e. step 1111). For the second 
one it detects it on Windows XP and 8 (on scan) but not on 7. 
We also provide the corresponding reports, where available, 
from VirusTotal and MetaDefender which state that Kaspersky 
detected them, but without information on the OS or detection 
step.   
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TABLE I.  DETECTION STEPS (CF. FIG 2) FOR KASPERSKY AV ON TWO 
MALWARE SAMPLES 
Malware MD5 XP Win7Win8 VirusTotal MetaDefender 
0859f181992bb4b113cdb94420347e721111 110 110 bit.ly/2mVozRY No report found 
0e16e2c22d90fcfdf639279cb2478587 110 1111 110 bit.ly/2mn0dNMbit.ly/2mHK7RB
 
We ran a small experiment where we sent over 5000 
malware samples to AVAMAT. Figure 4 is a 3D plot showing 
the stage of detection (z-axis) on different malware (y-axis) per 
dates of the experiment (x-axis; non-detection is step 1111) for 
Comodo on Windows 7. The malware in the y-axis have been 
ordered by average difficulty of detection by the AVs (from 
easiest – blue; to most difficult – red). This graph shows that 
there is diversity in malware detection, and stages of malware 
detection, even for the same AV on the same operating system 
on different dates. Most malware are either detected on scan 
(step 110) or not detected at all (step 1111) by Comodo on 
Windows 7.  
The analysis shown here is not possible with either 
VirusTotal or Metadefender. 
 
FIG. 4 - THE RATE OF MALWARE DETECTION (Z-AXIS) BY THE DIFFERENT 
VM(A,O) (Y-AXIS; NOTE: AT THIS STAGE OF TESTING 21 VMS WERE 
OPERATIONAL) PER STAGE OF DETECTION (X-AXIS; NON-DETECTION IS STEP 
1111) 
IV. LESSONS LEARNT, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented a tool called AVAMAT 
(AntiVirus and Malware Analysis Tool). We built AVAMAT 
to overcome the limitation`s of existing malware testing 
platforms, such as VirusTotal and Metadefender, that do use 
multiple AV products, but only their command line interfaces 
that have limited functionality. These platforms also do not 
provide details on when an AV product actually detected the 
malware (on entry, on scan, once malware executes, etc.). 
AVAMAT enables researchers to analyse different malware 
and AV product capabilities running on different OSs. 
Currently AVAMAT supports eight full capability AV 
products that are run, where available, on three versions of the 
Microsoft Windows OS: XP, 7 and 8. We also showed some 
initial results obtained with AVAMAT that highlight its 
advantages compared with VirusTotal or MetaDefender. 
Using AVAMAT we plan to run experimental campaigns 
to help us answer some of the following research questions (the 
list is not exhaustive): 
- What are the differences in the detection capabilities of 
different AV products? Are there differences in detection 
capabilities of AVs depending on the OS platform the AV 
product runs? 
- Do the AV products continue to detect a malware over 
time, or are there cases of regressions in detection 
behaviour?  
- Which combination of AV products and OS platforms give 
best detection capabilities against malware for a particular 
time period? 
- What are the false positive rates of AV products when 
subjected to benign files? Are there differences in these 
rates: by OS platform? By type of file? Etc.   
AVAMAT is currently being used within our Universities. 
This is to allow the functionality to be tested and debugged to 
improve the reliability of the tool and the results obtained from 
its use. We have two options of making the tool publically 
available for other researchers to use, once the testing stage is 
complete: 
- Release the code so that users can build their own version 
of AVAMAT, with their own AV products and licenses in 
their own environments; 
- Provide an API through which users can submit malware 
samples for analysis to AVAMAT (similar to how 
VirusTotal and Metadefender are used). But there are 
inevitable infrastructure costs for deploying a tool such as 
this, so the exact deployment and use model for AVAMAT 
remains to be decided.   
Current work and future enhancement for AVAMAT 
include building support for more AV products and operating 
systems, and a frontend for data analysis.  
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